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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing of bank loans and
bonds in international markets. The results obtained, using data on LDC
debtors, indicate that in both markets the country risk premium has responded
to some of the variables suggested by the theory. However, the way in which
these variables affect the risk premium differs across these markets. Data on
LDC bond yields in the secondarymarketfor 1980-85 are also used to analyze
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I. Introduction
The recent international debt crisis has generated renewed interest
in the study of the determinants of default country risk premia. A number of
papers have recently investigated, both theoretically and empirically, issues
related to the pricing of developing countries' foreign debt and to optimal
borrowing and lending strategies in international financial markets. In most
theoretical models sovereign borrowers face, up to a certain limit, an upward
sloping sipply curve of foreign funds. This upward-sloping portion of the
supplycurve reflects the fact that as the level of the debt increases, the
perceived probability of default (or rescheduling) also rises. 1/
Mostrecent empirical studies on creditworthiness and country risk
havedealt with the international bankloanmarket, and have ignored the bond
market in their effort to analyze the process of determination of default risk
prernia. For example, in Herring's (1983) volume on risk in international
markets the word "bond" is not listed in the subject index. On the other
hand, only one paper in Smith and Cuddington's (1985) recent volume addresses
the difference between the international bank loan and bond markets. AlSO,
most studies on debt rescheduling and on the determinants of risk spreads have
concentrated exclusively on the bank loan market. 2/
Although the international bank loan market has been significantly
more important, both in terms of coverage and volume, than the bond market, by
ignoring the latter in empirical analyses researchers may be omitting an
important source of information. In fact, some authors have pointed out that
the international bond and bank loan markets are significantly different both—2—
from economic and institutional points of view. 3/ It has even been argued
that whereas interest rates charged in the bank loan market do not reflect the
true risk associated with lending to the developing countries, yields on LDC
bonds do in fact capture this risk [Folkerts—Landau (1985)]. In the present
paper, data on spreads on bank loans to LDC5 and on yields on LDC bonds are
used to analyze the behavior of these two markets.
The purpose of the present paper is threefold. First, data on a
large number of developing debtor countries are used to compare the pricing of
bank loans and bonds in international financial markets. Data on Eurocurrency
loans granted to 26 developing countries between 1976 and 1980, and on bonds
issued by 13 developing countries during the same period are used to analyze
the determination of the default risk premium. The second objective of the
paper is to test some of the implications of the more recent models of foreign
borrowing and country risk. In particular, the propositions that the default
risk premium is a positive function of the level of debt and a negative
function of the level of investment are tested. LI]And third, data on yields
on Mexican and Brazilian bonds in the secondary market between 1980 and 1985
are used to analyze the way in which this market anticipated and reacted to
the debt crisis.
The paper is organized in the following form: Section II briefly
discusses some of the more important economic and institutional differences
between the bank loan and bond. markets. In Section III data on spreads on
bank loans granted to 26 developing countries between 1976 and 1980 and on
initial offering yields on 167 bonds floated by 13 developing countries
between 1976 and 1980 are used to analyze the process of risk pricing in these
markets. In this section the results obtained from the bank loans data set—3—
andfrom the bonds data set are formally compared. In Section IV monthly data
on yields on Mexican and Brazilian bonds in the secondary market for the
period 1980—85 are used to analyze the market reaction to the debt crisis.
Finally, in Section V sane concluding remarks are offered.
II. The International Bond Market and the International Bank Loan Market
During the nineteenth century and early twentieth century the public
floatatlon of bonds was the most important form that developing countries had
of obtaining international financing. In order to induce investors to hold
these bonds, their yields were quite high, reflecting the market's perceived
probability of default. In fact, during this period many countries actually
defaulted on their bonds. 5/ On the other hand, during the 1970s and 198Os, the
role of the bond market has been greatly reduced. International borrowing by
developing countries has been largely dominated by bank loans, the majority of
which have been granted by bank syndicates. Also, during this period outright
defaults havebeenreplaced by multilateral reschedulings. In spite of the
reduced importance of the bond market in modern times, a number of developing
countries have been able to float bonds. Between 1978 and 19814, for example,
50 developing countries issued bonds for an equivalent of approximately US27
billion. Even though this amount represents no more than ten percent of new
bank lending during the same period, it is still quite substantial in absolute
terms.
Some authors have pointed out that the international bank loan and
bond markets are significantly different both from institutional and economic
perspectives. In particular, it has even been argued that while interest
rates charged in the bank loan market do not reflect the true risk associatedwith lending to the developing countries, yields on LDCs' bonds do in fact
capture this risk [Folkerts—Landau (1985)]. In this section some of the more
important differences between the international bank loan and bond markets
will be briefly discussed. In the next section data on spreads on bank
Euroloans and on LDCs' bonds will be used to empirically analyze the extent to
which the process of determination of the country risk premium differs between
these two markets.
A first important difference between the international bank loan and
bond markets is that in the former banks form a fairly cohesive group; bond-
holders, on the other hand, are highly dispersed. This cohesion allows banks
to react uniformly to debt repayment problems, and makes the job of monitoring
and enforcing debt contracts much easier. Two fairly recent institutional
developments have enhanced banks' ability to form a cohesive group. Ftrst,
the fact that most international bank loans are made by syndicates implies
that fairly large groups of banks establish a partner-type relationship at
early stages of the lending process. Second, as a result of cross default
clauses, when a bank (or syndicate) gets in trouble because of a borrower's
default, all other banks that have loans outstanding with that country will
also be affected by the crisis. 6/
Banks' cohesive behavior gives them an additional advantage to impose
sanctions on those countries that default, or threaten to default. In fact,
banks' ability to act cohesively has allowed them to enter into efficient
negotiations processes with troubled debtor countries, and to reschedule most
of their debt. Bondholders, on the other hand, usually are too dispersed to
agree with each other on how to handle a debt crisis. 7/ Sachs and Cohen
(1982) have actually argued that whereas bank lending is implicitly lending—5—
with an option to renegotiate, bond lending excludes the possibility of re-
scheduling. Consequently, in their model bond lending is more risky ——that
is, for the same amount of debt, country risk premia are higher on bonds than
on bank loans. 8/
Thereare other, perhaps more important, reasons why the level of
risk involved in international bank lending might be lower than that implicit
in bond lending. During the last twenty years or so monetary authorities,
both in developed and developing countries, have increasingly guaranteed bank
deposits and loans. In fact, nowadays bank deposits and loans are, in most
countries, implicitly or explicity insured; in a way Central Banks have agreed
to become lenders of last resort. Consequently, it has been argued by McKinnon
(19814) and Folkerts-Landau (1985) among others, that the moral hazard factor
has become increasingly important in bank lending. According to this view,
risk premia charged on bank loans do not reflect the real risk involved in
these operations (see also Gutentag and Herring [1985a]). The bond market, on
the other hand, has not been affected by this broadening implicit insurance
scheme. Folkerts—Landau (1985) has argued that whereas bank loan spreads
reflect the probability of recheduling, bond spreads reflect the probability
of default.
Anotherimportant difference between the bankloan and bond markets
is that, while there are no secondary markets for bank loans, there is a
fairly active secondary market for developing countries' bonds. In fact, the
existence of this secondary market can be exploited to advantage in empirical
studies of the country risk issue. For example, the behavior of bond yields
inthe secondary market can provide important information on the extent to
which, after the debt crisis, the value of LDCs debt has been discounted by—6—
the international financial community. 9/ This is done, for example, in
Section IV of this paper.
According to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b) and Gersovitz (1985), it is
not clear whether there is more risk involved in international bank lending
than in bond lending. They recognize that banks behave in a more cohesive way
than bondholders, and that consequently have a clear advantage to impose
sanctions. On the other hand, they argue that the non—cohesive behavior of
bondholders forces countries to give them a "generous treatment relative to
banks" (Gersovitz, 1985). The reason for this is that if'paymentson bond
debt are suspended, bondholders have no alternative to calling a default. In
fact, almost every country that has recently run into debt difficulties has
tried to continue paying interest and amortizing their publicly sold bonds.
Even though legally there are rio debt seniority provisions in international
lending, the tradition is that, as in the case of domestic lending, bond-
holders have precedence. 10/ Banks, on the other hand, can actually postpone
the declaration of default while they negotiate with the debtor country the
conditions under which the existing debt can be restructured. Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981b) have further argued that, since public bonds are usually
sold by prospectus, in the bond market there is more information regarding the
level and conditions of foreign debt than in the bank loan market.
In sum, there are a number of economic, legal and institutional dis-
tinctions between the international bank loan and bond markets. In general,
the majority of authors seem to be in agreement that there is a somewhat
greater risk involved in bond lending. As a result of the implicit or ex-
plicit central bank guarantees on bank deposits and loans, spreads on these
loans would not reflect the real default country risk involved. On the otherhand, according to this view, spreads on bonds would reflect in a more
accurate way this risk. If this is the case, it is expected that spreads on
bank loans and spreads on bonds will in fact be determined in a different way,
with the latter being more sensitive to those variables that, according to the
theory, affect the level of country risk. In Sections III and IV of this
paper this issue is investigated empirically.
III. The International Bank Loan Market, the Bond Market and Default
Country Risk: 1976-80
In this section data on over 900 Eurocurrency bank loans granted to
LDCs between 1976 and 1980, and on 167 bonds issued by LDCs during this period
are used to investigate the process by which the bank loans and bond markets
determine the default country risk premium. 11/ In particular, it is tested if,
as numerous models on foreign borrowing have suggested [i.e., Hanson (19714),
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a,b), Sachs (1982, 19814), Sachs and Cohen (1982),
Edwards (1983)], the level of the country risk premium increases with the
level of foreign indebtedness (i.e., the debt GNP ratio). Also, other
implications of some theoretical models are tested, including the negative
relationship between the investment—GNP and international reserves—GNP ratios
and the country risk premium. In this section the results obtained from the
bank loans and bond regressions are formally compared in order to assess
whether these two markets price risk in a different way.
In the case of a developing country that cannot affect the world rate
of interest, the cost. of foreign funds obtained from abroad is formed by two
elements:(1) "the" (exogenously given) risk—free world interest rate (i*);
and (2) a country—risk premium (s) related to the probability of default or—8—
rescheduling. Suppose that this probability of default, as perceived by the
lender (p), depends positively on the debt-output ratio D, and negatively on
other variables, like the investment-GNP ratio. In order to simplify the
discussion, consider the case of a one—period loan, where in case of default
the lender (i.e., foreign bank or bondholder) will completely lose the
interest and the principal. In this case the equilibrium condition for a
risk-neutral lender will be given by:
(i—p)[i÷(i*i.s)j= (ii-i). (1)
Fromhere, this country's risk premium can be written as:
(2)
where k =(1+1*).12/ If, alternatively, it is assumed that when default occurs
only a fractionof interest and principal is lost, equation (2) should be
replaced by s =[(l—)p/(l
—(1—c)p)]k.13/
Since the probability of default p is assumed to depend positively on
the debt-output ratio D, according to equation (2) the country in question
will face an upward—sloping supply curve for foreign funds (i.e., s/D > 0).
Moreover, when the probability of default approaches unity, the country risk
premium s will approach infinity. This means that developing countries will
face an upward-sloping supply curve of foreign funds up to a certain point,
and that when the probability of default gets very close to unity, a credit
ceiling will be reached. At that point, the country in question will be
completely excluded from the world's credit markets [Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981),Sachs(1982,19811),Sachs and Cohen (1982),Kharas(19811)].—9--
With respect to the probability of default, in the empirical analysis





where the xs are the determinants of the probability of default (including
the level of indebtedness) and the s are the corresponding coefficients.
Combining (3) and (2), and adding a random disturbance ,thefollowing
equation, which can be estimated using conventional methods, is obtained:
log s =logk +Zx1
+ ()4)
Regarding the determinants of the probability of default (i.e., the
xs in equation (3)) a number of variables suggested by theoretical studies
were considered:
(1) The debt—output ratio. As has been pointed out above, in most
theoretical models of foreign borrowing the debt—output ratio plays a crucial
role; it is expected that this variable will have a positive coefficient in
the regression analysis [Hanson (1971), Harberger (1980), Sachs (19814), Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981a), Edwards (1983)]. The data for the debt-output ratio
used in this paper refer to public and publicly guaranteed debt and were
obtained from various issues of the World Debt Tables. It should be noted,
however, that a number of previous empirical studies, that have used data on
bank loans spreads, have failed to find this positive effect of the level of
debt on the country risk premium. For example, Feder and Just (1977b) found,
using data for 1973 and 19714,a very low and insignificant regression
coefficient for the debt—output ratio. Moreover, in their preferred—10—
regression they dropped this variable from the analysis. Sachs (1981), on the
other hand, obtained a very small (0.0008) and insignificant coefficient for
the debt—output ratio in his cross—section study. Burton and Inoue (1985)
also obtained small and insignificant coefficients for this variable in their
analysis of banks' risk premia. 114/
(2) Ratio of international reserves to GNP. This indicator measures
the level of international liquidity held by a country, and as suggested in
Edwards (1983), it is expected that its coefficient will be negative.
Gersovitz (1985), however, has recently argued, that under a willingness—to—
pay approach to foreign borrowing, higher international reserves will reduce
creditworthiness and will result in an increase in the country risk premium
(s). This variable wasconstructedfrom data obtained from the International
Financial Statistics.
(3) Investment to GNP ratio. This variable captures the country's
perspectives for future growth. As is shown in Sachs and Cohen (1982), Sachs
(1982, 198)4) and in Edwards (1983), it should be negatively related to the
spread; a higher investment ratio enhances creditworthiness. However,
Gersovitz (1985) has recently argued that if borrowers use foreign funds to
undertake risk-reducing investment, they will reduce the cost of the penalty
in case of default. Hence, higher investment ratios will reduce creditworthi—
ness and increase the default country risk premium. Whether this variable
affects positively or negatively the risk premium is, then, an empirical
issue. The data on the investment ratio were obtained from various issues of
the World Tables and the World Development Report.
)4) Ratio of the current account to GNP. Sachs (1981) has argued
that this variable will be negatively related to the spread. The data on this—11—
variable were obtained from World Tables and various issues of the World
Development Report.
(5) Debt service ratio. This indicator, computed as the ratio of
debt service to exports, measures possible liquidity (as opposed to solvency)
probleuis faced by a particular country. It is expected that higher debt
service ratios will reduce the degree of creditworthiness and result in a
higher s (Feder and Just, 1977b). Data on this ratio refer to public and
publicly guaranteed debt and were obtained from various issues of the World
Debt Tables.
(6) Imports—GNP ratio. This indicator measures the degree of openness
of the country in questi'on. To the extent that, as Frenkel (1983) has post—
lated, more open economies are more vulnerable to foreign shocks, it is
expected that the coefficient of this variable will be positive. This indi-
cator was constructed with data obtained from the International Financial
Statistics.
(7) Growth of per capita GDP. It has been suggested [Feder and Just
(1977b)] that a higher rate of growth of per capita output will enhance
creditworthiness. Data on this indicator were obtained from the World Tables
and World Development Report.
(8) Index of real effective exchange rate (REER). Cline (1983) has
recently argued that the inappropriate exchange rate policies followed in a
number of LDCs were one of the most important causes of the debt crisis. In
particular, according to this view the sustained real appreciations of these
countries' currencies played a major role in the process of overborrowing. In
order to analyze whether the real exchange rate behavior indeed affected the
perceived degree of creditworthiness, an index of trade—weighted real—12-
effective exchange rates for these countries was also included in the
analysis. The data on this index were obtained fromEdwards andNg (1985).
In addition to these variables related to the degree of country risk
of a particular country, variables that summarize the specific characteristics
of bank loans and bond issues --likematurity and so on ——werealso
incorporated in the respective regressions.
111.1 Country Risk and Bank Loans
In theanalysis on bank loans that follows, itis assumed that the
world'srisk-free interest rate icanbe approximated byLIBOR.It is also
assumed that in the bank loans market the default country risk premium s is
given by the spread over LIBOR charged to different countries. The assumption
that the spread over LIBOR captures the probability ofdefaulthas some
problems, since the cost of borrowingincludes additional elements, like fees
andcommissions. Unfortunately there are noreliabledata on these components
of the cost. 15/ However, during the period consideredin this section
(1976-80),these additional elements were typically very small comparedto the
interestcost, and were relatively uniform across loans and countries. This, of
course, has not been the case in the more recent period, where debt
resehedulings have been characterized by very substantial fees and commissions.
In the regression analysis, data on spreads for 26 countries during
1976—1980 were used. 16/ The spread variable was constructed, in each year, as a
weighted average of spreads actually charged for public and publicly guaranteed
Eurocurrency bank loans, denominated in U.S.dollars,and granted to each
particular country. The weights were given by the value of each loan. The
basic data were obtained from various issues of the World Bank's Borrowing in
International and Capital Markets.—13—
Following the traditional convention, of the following type of pooled
regressions were estimated (where n refers to the nth country and t to the t
time period):
log 5nt = + +
where and are country—specific and time—specific fixed effects terms,
and -isan error with the usual characteristics. Note that the time—specific
term is capturing log k [= log(1+i)]from equation (a).Inorder to test
whether the and dummies should indeed be included in the regression, F-
statistics for their significance as a group were computed. 17/ In every case it
was found that the nullhypothesisthat each of these effects were zero as a
group was strongly rejected; consequently both and cz were included in the
estimation. Equation (5) was estimated using both OLS and instrumental
variables techniques. The reason for this is that sane of the country risk
determinants may not be completely exogenous. 18/
In addition to the country risk variables described above two variables
related to the specific characteristic of bank loans were also included. The
variable "maturity" measures the (weighted) average maturity of bank loans
granted to a particular country. As has been shown by Feder and Ross (1982),
its a priori sign in the regression analysis is ambiguous. The weighted average
of loan maturities was constructed from data reported in Borrowing in
tional Capital Markets.The variable "loan volume" shows the weighted average
value ofeachbank loan, and was constructed using data obtained from Borrowing
in International Capital Markets. Also, a priori, its sign is ambiguous.
ifl Table 1 the results obtained from the estimation of equations of the
type of (5) for the case of bank loans are presented. As can be seen these—14—
resultsare quite satisfactory. First, and contrary to most previous results
[i.e., Feder and Just (1977b), Sachs (1981), Burton and Inoue (1985)J, the
coefficient of the debt-output ratio was positive, as expected, and always
significant at conventional levels. Also, the value of the coefficient was
quite robust across specifications; its point estimate ranged from 0.75 to
1.09. These results provide support to most modern theoretical models which
postulate that LDCs face, up to a certain point, an upward-sloping supply curve
of foreign funds.
Thecoefficient of the reserves to GNP ratio was in most cases
negative, but it was never significant. This suggests that for these countries
and during this level period the international liquidity held by each country
played no significant role in the process of determination of bank-loan country
risk premia.
On the other hand, the coefficient of gross investment to ON? was in
all cases negative, as expected. Further, in all the regressions, this
coefficient was significant at conventional levels. These results provide
important support to thosemodels that postulate that the level of the country
risk premium isaffected by the way in which the borrowed funds are spent. The
absolutevalue of the point estimate of this coefficient is quite similar to
that of the debt outpit ratio. In order to test whether these two coefficients
weresignificantly different in absolute terms, an F—test was computed. The F—
statistic had a value of 0.005, indicating that the null hypothesis that these
coefficients are equal in absolute terms cannot be rejected. This suggests
that, if a country uses all its additional foreign indebtedness to increase
investment, its level of creditworthiness will tend not to change. However, if
someof the additional foreign funds are used to finance consumption, the
perceived probability of default will increase. 19/—15—
Perhapssurprisingly, the coefficient of the current account to GNP
ratio, which measures the fraction of investment financed through borrowing from
abroad, was never significant. This contrasts with Sachs' (1981) findings,
where in a cross country analysis (for 1979), this ratio was found to be
significantly negative.
The coefficient of the debt service ratio was always positive, as
expected, and in three of the regressions significantat conventional levels.
This provides some indication that the determination of the country risk premium
in bank lending has reflected both solvency and liquidity considerations. 20/ The
import/GNP ratio, on the other hand, turned out to be negative in all the
regressions where it was included, and in two of these is was significant at the
10 percent level. The coefficient of growth was always insignificant, as was
that of the real exchange rate index. This provides some evidence indicating
that a real exchange rate overvaluation did not result in higher perceived
probabilities of default. It shouldberecognized, however, that this result is
not conclusive, since only under fairly restrictive assumptions can declines in
REER be interpreted as a movement towards over valuation. 21/ With respect to the
variables that measure the loans' characteristics, the coefficient of the loan
maturity was negative in all cases, and was significant in only one of the
regressions. The coefficient of loan value also had negative coefficients in
every regression; only in one of them was it significant.
In the equations reported in Table 1 a number of the country—risk
variables turned out to be insignificant. For this reason, and in order to
check the robustness of this results, some regressions that excluded these
variables (but still included the country and time—specific dummies, the loan
value and maturity) were also run. The results obtained clearly support those—16—
reported in Table 1 and discussed above. For example the reestimation of
equation (5.1) after dropping the insignificant country risk variables yielded
the following result:








In sum, the results reported here indicate that the pricing of bank
loans has indeed responded to (some of) the variables suggested by the theory.
In particular these regressions show that the country risk premium Is positively
affected by higher level of indebtedness and higher debt—service ratio, and
negatively affected by higher levels of investment. Given the relatively small
variation that spreads and bank loans exhibited both across countries and over
time during this period, it is somewhat surprising to find that they have in
fact responded to the most important elements pointed out by the theory. In
fact, until very recently some authors had argued that since bank spreads have
varied so little, they could not have reflected the economic determinants of the
country risk premium [Gutentag and Herring (1985), Folkerts-Landau (1985)]. The
results reported here provide some evidence to the contrary.
111.2 The Bond Market and Country Risk
In this section data on yields on initial offering for 167 bonds
floated by 13 LDCs between 1976 and 1980 are used to analyze the process of
determination of the default country risk premium in the bond market. 22/ Even—1 7—
Table 1. BANK LOAN SPREADS: POOLED DATA, 1976-80
Notes: OLS is ordinary leastsquares and INST is instrumental variables. The
number in parentheses are t—statistics. N refers to the number of
observations. F istheF statistic for the regression as a whole, and
—2 2 P is the Rcorrectedby degrees of freedom.










































































































N 116 113 113 113 113
0.889 0.897 0,8914 0.892 0.891
F 26.11 23.88 25.614 25.30 214.33—18—
though the data on bonds yields used in this section are not exactly equivalent
to the data on bank loans spreads used in. Section 111.1, both sets of results
are later compared in order to assess the extent to which these two markets have
behaved differently.
Since only a small number of developing countries floated bonds in the
1976—80 period, we faced a degrees of freedom problem. For this reason, the
data on bonds' yields were treated somewhat differently than the data on bank
spreads. First, bonds denominated in Us dollars, DM, Yen, and Swiss Francs were
considered. Consequently, currency dummies were incorporated to the
regressions. Second, bonds placed both by the public and private sectors were
included, and an index that distinguishes across borrowers wasintroducedin the
regression analysis. However, only 26 out of the 167 bonds were issued by the
private sector. And third, the yields were not averaged for every year; the
independent variable, then, is the spread on each individual bond.
Both international (i.e., Eurobonds) and foreign bonds were included,
and a dummy variable (Type) that took the value of 1 for Eurobonds was intro-
duced. The majority of the bonds considered (9i4 out of 167) were, in fact,
foreign bonds. In the regression a distinction was also made as to whether a
particular bond had been publicly or privately issued. The dummy variable
"Issue" took the value of one for publicly floated bonds. Finally, in order to
have a homogeneous data set, floating rate notes were excluded from the
regression analysis. 23/
The data on LDC bond yields were obtained from various issues of the
World Bank Borrowing in International Capital Markets. Since the World Bank
discontined this publication in 1981, the yields considered here include all the
data available from this particular source. Depending on the currency of—19—
denomination of each bond, the spreads were constructed as the difference
between their yieldsandthe yield of long—term US, German, Swiss or Japanese
government bonds. The data on the developed countries bond yields were obtained
from various issues of the IFS. With respect to the country risk explanatory
variables, exactly the same variables used in the bank loan regressions were
incorporated. Of course, in addition to these country-risk variables, the bond—
specific variables ——suchas maturity, type, issue and borrower -—werealso
incorporated.
Equations of the type of (5)wereestimated for spreads on all the LDC
bonds and for the subset of LDCforeignbonds. As in the case of banks, the
regressions were estimated using both an OLSfixedeffect method and a fixed
effectinstrumental variables procedure. 2L/ In Table 2 the results obtained are
presented. These results are quite interesting. First, as in the case of bank
loans, the coefficient of the debt output ratioispositive, and in most equa-
tions significant at conventional levels.Itis interesting to note that the
pointestimate of this coefficient appears to be, in general, slightly higher
for the bonds regressions than for the bank spread regressions of Table 1.
Another interesting finding relates to the gross investment ratio. As
wasexpected,and as in the case of the bank spreads, this coefficient was
always negative and significant. In the bonds regressions, however, the
absolute valie of the point estimate is significantly smaller than that obtained
inthebank loan regressions.This indicates that increases in the investment
ratioenhances creditworthiness by significantly more in the bank loan market
thanin the bond market. This finding is in fact indicative that, as suggested
by some authors and discussed in Section II of this paper, bonds and bank loans
are priced inadifferent way.Table 2.
—20—
BOND SPREADS:POOLED DATA, 1976—80
Notes: t—statistics in parentheses.
a! These equations were estimated including time—specific dummies and currency
dummies.
EQ (5.8) EQ (5.9)EQ (5.10)EQ(5.11)EQ(5.12)EQ (5.13)
All All All Foreign Foreign Foreign
Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds
(OLS) (OLS) (INST) (OLS) (OLS) (INST)
































































































































































F 7.67 7.14 7.06 9.18 8.63 8.58—21-
A puzzling result relates to the debt service coefficient. Contrary to
what was expected, and to the case of bank loans, this coefficient turned out to
be negative. Moreover, in one of the six equations it was marginally signifi-
cant. The coefficients of imports/ GNP, growth, REER, borrower, type and issue
were in all cases insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficient of
maturity, however, was significantly negative. As in the case of bank loans,
this is somewhat puzzling since it suggests the presence of a negatively sloped
yield curve.
The results reported in this section, then, further &upport some of the
more important implications of modern models of external borrowing. First,
there is evidence that bond spreads depend postively on the level of
indebtedness of the country. This result is in agreement with the findings
reported in Section 111.1 for bank loans. Second, the results reported in Table
2 also indicate that the perceived degree of country risk is negatively affected
by the level of investment a country undertakes. With the exception of maturity
and the debt service ratio, the other coefficients included in these bond spread
regressions were typically not significant.
111.3 Comparison
A comparison of the bank and bond spread regressions does suggest that,
as was discussed in Section II of this paper, there are some differences in the
way in which risk is priced in each of these markets. While both spreads are
affected in a significant fashion by the debt—output, debt-service and gross
investment ratios, a casual look at the evidence suggests that bond spreads are
(slightly) more sensitive to increases in the debt output ratio, and that they
are less sensitive to changes in the investment ratio. This latter difference—22—
was actually quite marked. Also, while the bank spreads regressions suggested a
negative relation between the reserves ratio and the degree of creditworthiness,
the bonds spreads regressions indicate in that market that such relation is
either non-existent or positive. Moreover, as expected, the bank spreads were
positively affected by a higher debt service ratio; the bond regressions,
however, indicate a negative relation between spreads and debt service ratio.
Finally, in both sets of regressions, the coefficient of maturity turned out to
be negative.
In order to get additional insights on the process of risk pricing in
these two markets, regressions for bonds and bank loans spreads were
simultaneously estimated using jointly generalized least squares (i.e.,
seemingly unrelated regressions). The data set used was slightly smaller, and
excluded bonds issued by the private sector. Tests for the equality, across
equations, of the coefficients of the debt—output ratio, the investment ratio,
the reserves ratio, the debt service ratio and the current account to GNP ratio
were performed. The F—statistics obtained indicate that the null hypothesis of
equality across equations of the debt output coefficient cannot be rejected (F =
0.33).On the other hand, the hypothesis of equality across equations of the
debt service ratio was strongly rejected (F =5.79),as were the hypotheses of
equal coefficients across equations for the investment ratio (F2.9) and for
the reserves ratio (F =2.7).Finally, the equality of the current account
ratio could not be rejected at marginal levels (F =2.1).
In general, then, the comparison of the bank and bond spread re-
gressions suggest some differences between the process of risk pricing in these
markets. The more important of these differences relates to the impact of the
investment ratio on the risk premium. While in both markets higher investment—23—
enhances creditworthiness, this effect is much more important in the bank loans
market. Even though the results reported here are by no means conclusive, they
do indicate that in both markets (some of) the relevant theoretical variables
played an important role in determining the country risk premium.
IV. The Secondary Market for LDC Bonds and the Debt Crisis: 1980-85
The results presented in the preceding section showed that, during
1976—80, spreads in the international bank loan market and in the bond market
reflected(some of) the theoretical determinants of the default country risk
premium. However, the data used in that analysis did riot include the debt
crisisperiod. Inthis section the behavior of country risk premia during and
iediatelyafter the debt crisis is investigated. Some interesting questions
relate to whether the international financial community anticipated the crisis
and the extent to which the market reflected, after the crisis erupted, the
higher risk involved in LDC lending. Unfortunately these questions cannot be
addressedwith data of the type usedin Section III. Aftermid-1982 the vast
majority of these countriescould not float bonds. Also, since that date a
largeproportion of bank loans have reflected "forced lending," where the
spreadscharged -—evencorrected by fees and commissions --don'tnecessarily
reflect the implicit riskiness of dealing with these troibled countries.
However,the change in perception regarding the degree of riskiness of
LDCs debt can be analyzed using data from the secondary market for LDC bonds.
In this section data on yields on Mexican and Brazilian bonds in the secondary
market are used to analyze the characteristics of this market, and its reaction
to changes in the perception of the level of risk. Figure 1 presents monthly






































bond and between a Brazilian bond and the same World Bank bond, for the period
October 1980 through March 1985. Since it can be reasonably assumed that World
Bank bonds are quite safe, these spreads can be considered as good proxies for
the default country risk premium. 25/
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this figure is that, contrary
to bank loan spreads, the bonds' yield spreads 'experienced significant
variations during this period. For both countries it was slightly negative from
October 1980 through mid—1982. It then jumped, reaching peaks of more than 800
basis points for Mexico and 1400 basis points for Brazil. In late 19814 and early
1985 the spreads experienced an important decline for both bonds. Also, this
figure suggests that the market anticipated by only a few weeks --andonly
partially ——theMexican debt crisis of August 20, 1982. As late as July of
1982, the spreads were negative, and not significantly different from the
average for the preceding 18 months. Gutentag and Herring (1985a), however,
have argued that the market anticipated by approximately a full year the
crisis. Clearly, that contention is not reflected in our spreads data presented
in Figure 1.
It is interesting to see whether the major turning points in these
spreads were in any way related to major economic or political events in these
countries. The first major increase inthespreads took place in early August
1982, just prior to Mexico's official announcement that it was facing serious
problems to pay its debt. This August jimp in the spread ——whichfor Mexico
was equal to 319 basis points —-tookplace only 30 days after Mexico had
obtained a jumbo loan for US$2.5 billion under convenient conditions. The
relative tranqiility observed in the spreadst behavior until July of 1982 is
somewhat puzzling. Between the third quarter of 1981 and June of 1982, the—26-
international media was plagued by stories that clearly pointed out that both
the Mexican and Brazilian economies were facing serious problems. For example,
between July 1981 and mid—August 1982, the New York Times published twelve
stories that stressed the sharp weakening of Mexico's external position. 26/
During the same period, the New York Times published four stories related to
Brazil's external sector. A possible interpretation for the apparent normal
behavior of the spreads, is that until July of 1982 most analysts —-andthe
market ——believedthat these countries were going through temporary cash flow
problems, but that their solvency was not seriously at stake. 27/
During September of 1982, new negative developments affected the
Mexican economy. On September 1, President Lopez Portillo nationalized the
banks; on September 7, the government announced that all principal payments of
the foreign debt would be suspended until the end of 198g. On the positive
side, the IMF announced that it expected to have a US$5 billion package for
Mexico by late 1980. The market reacted to this news by further discounting the
value of Mexico's debt: in October of 1982, the spread reached 612 basis points.
Interestingly enough, between July and October of 1982 no major
negative events affected the Brazilian economy. In spite of this, between July
and October, the Brazilian spread increased by 418 basis points. There is
little doubt that the market was reacting to the Mexican and Argentinian
situations, and was in fact anticipating Brazil's formal acknowledgement that it
was also in serious trouble, and that it could not make payments on itsdebt.
Between October of 1982 and April of 1983, while the Mexican spread continued to
climb, the Brazilian spread stabilized around 280—300 basis points. The fact
that Brazil reached an early agreement -—inFebruary of 1983 -—withits
creditors, was reflected in the relatively lower and stable spread on its bonds.—27—
Clearly, at least until December of 1982, the behavior of the Mexican
spread reflected the chaotic situation that characterized the last few months of
the Lopez Portillo administration. In December of that. year, President de la
Madrid was sworn in, and strict austerity measures were announced. On December
22, the IMF gave final approval to a Us$14 billion loan to Mexico. Between
December 1982 and April of 1983, the Mexican government continued to negotiate
with banks, and to implement corrective measures. In May 1983, the IMF
announced that Mexico's economic performance during the first quarter was in
line with the agreement with the Fund. In that month the Mexican spread
experienced, for the first time in 10 months, a significant decline: 152 basis
points. For the next 13 months the Mexican spread continued to decline, as the
economy's conditions improved significantly. On August 27, 1983, an agreement
to reschedule Mexico's debt was signed. After further reductions, in June of
19814, the spread reached its lowest value since mid—1982. In July 19814 the
spread began to climb once again. A possible explanation for this is that
during the second half of 1982 the market was unsure whether the Mexican
government was also going to reschedule its bond debt. In late 19814, however,
it was officially announced that neither bonds nor debt to international
agencies would be rescheduled and the spread, once again, declined.
Throughout this period —-April1983 to June 19814 —-theBrazilian
authorities continued to make some progress in further negotiations with the IMF
and with banks. In July of 1983, a new agreement with the IMF was reached, and
the disbursement of the Us$5.14 billion standby loan continued. At the same
time, the political system was going through important reforms, as Brazil got
ready for the first civilian president in 20 years. Between April 1983 and May
19814, the Brazilian spread was remarkably stable, averaging 285 basis points.—28—
Between May 1984 and January 1985 —-themonth when the new president was
supposed to be chosen --theBrazilian spread experienced a steep increase,
climbing by more than 490 basis points. The behavior of the spread during this
period reflected, basically, political uncertainty. These months were
characterized by political turmoil, as the issue of whether the next president
should be elected by direct popular vote was actively -—andsometimes
violently -—discussed.On January 15, 1985, Tancredo eves was elected,
without major incident, as the first civilian Brazilian president in more than
20 years. That month the government reported that it had made important
progress in negotiations to reshedule US$50 billion of its debt. During March
and April, the Brazilian spread dropped dramatically to its June 1982—June 1984
levels.
In order to formally analyze the behavior of the risk premium in the
bond secondary market, a regression analysis using data on the Mexican bond
spreads was undertaken. Due to some data deficiency, the Brazilian spreads were
not scrutinized as closely. A problem with this analysis, however, is that
there are no monthly data on total debt, total debt service, or GNP for
Mexico. For this reason, in this regression analysis it is not possible to ise
the same independent variables as in Section lIlt; a number of proxies were
used. The ratio of the financial system long-term foreign debt relative to
exports was used as a proxy of the debt output ratio. 28/ The international
reserves to imports ratio was used as a proxy for the reserves output ratio.
Also, the balance of trade, the annual rate of growth in manufacturing
production, the index of the effective real exchange rate and the price of
Mexican oil were included in the regression. 29/ In the specification used the
spread was the dependent variable and the spread lagged one period was included
as an explanatory variable; all independent variables were lagged one month. 30/—29--
Thefollowing results were obtained from the estimation of the time
series of the Mexican bonds spreads in the secondary market.
spread =—6.6141+0.820(Debt/Export)—0.768(Reserves/Imports)
(—1.623) (2.807) (—3.6314)
+0.0005(Bof Trade) —9.2811(GrowthManuf. Prod.)
(1.233) (—1.695)




Theseestimates are quite interesting. First, as expected, the
coefficient of the debt—export ratio was positive and significant at conven-
tional levels. This result is in agreement with those obtained th Section III,
and indicates that the secondary market takes into account se of the economic
variables suggested by the theory when pricing LDCs' bonds. Also, as expected,
the coefficient of the reserves—imports ratio was negativeand significant.
With the exception of the price of oil all other explanatory variables were
insignificant.
These results were obtained using the actual values of the explanatory
variables. However, modern theories of financial markets' behavior have
suggested that expectations play a crucial role and that asset prices react to
unanticipated changes of the relevant variables. In order to anlayze the extent
to which this has been the case for Mexican bonds, this equation was also
estimated using proxies for the unexpected changes of all the right—hand side—30-
variables. Interestingly enough the results obtained when "surprises" of the
right-hand side variables were used basically confirm those reported above. 31/
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper several aspects of LDCs' foreign borrowing and country
risk have been investigated. The empirical analysis looked at the process of
determination of country risk premia both in the bank loan and bond markets, and
compared the way in which LDCs' debt is priced in these two markets. These two
markets have important differences both from economic and institutional
perspectives. Some authors (e.g., Folkerts—Landau, (1985)) have even argued
that, whereas interest rates charged by banks do not reflect the true risk
associated with lending to the LDCs, yields on developing countries' bonds do in
fact capture this risk.
The main findings of this analysis can be summarized as follows.
First, it was found that, both in the bond and bank loan markets, the country
risk premium has been a positive function of the debt output ratio and a
negative function of the investment GNP ratio. This corresponds to what most
modern models of foreign borrowing have suggested, and contradicts findings
reported in previous studies [i.e., Feder and Just (1977b), Sachs (1981) and
Burton and Inoue (1985fl, where, using spreads on bank loans and different data
sets, this coefficient was not significant. In the bank loan regressions it was
also found that other variables, like the reserves to GNP ratio and the current
account ratio, had the expected sign but were typically non—significant; the
debt service ratio was, however, marginally significant.
Second, a comparison of the bank and bond regressions indicates that,
as argued by some authors, there are some differences in the process of-31—
determination of country risk premia in these two markets. These differences
are reflected by the fact that in the regressioas some of the coefficients are
significantly different across markets. However, the coefficient of the debt
output ratio is the only coefficient not significantly different across these
two regressions.
Third, using data on yields on Mexican and Brazilian bonds in the
secondary market, it was found that the international financial market had only
anticipated by a few weeks —-andonly partially --theMexican crisis of August
20, 1982. These data also show that after the debt crisis, the market dis-
counted quite heavily the Brazilian and Mexican debt. A regression analysis
performed using time series of monthly spreads of Mexican bonds in the secondary
niarket confirm the results obtained in the preceding sections, in the sense that
the country risk premium had responded to some of the variables suggested by the
theory. Also, this analysis indicates that changes in the Mexican country risk
premium responded to unanticipated changes (or surprises) of the relevant
exogenous variables.—32--
FOOTNOTES
1/ On the recent debt problem, see the volume edited by Smith and Cuddington
(1985). See also Sachs (19814) and the survey by Eaton, Gersovitz and
Stiglitz (1986). For an analysis of different aspects of international
risk, see Herring (1983). On country risk and creditworthiness see, for
example, Feder and Just (1977b), Feder and Ross (1982), Melvin and
Schiagenhauff (1986), Feder and Uy (1985) and Edwards (19814, 1986).
2/ See, however, Eichengreen and Fortes (1986). On debt rescheduling see, for
example, Cline and Frank (1971), Feder and Just (197Ta), Cline (1983), and
McFadden et. al. (1985). On risk spreads, see Feder and Just (1977b) and
Edwards(19814).
3/See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a), Gersovitz (1985), Sachs and
Cohen (1982), Sachs (19814), Sachs (1982), McKinnon (1984), and especially
Folkerts—Landau (1985).
14/See,for example, Sachs (19814), Sachs and Cohen (1982), Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981b), and Edwards (1983).
5/ For a fascinating account of some of the LDCs' defaults, see Wynrie (1951).
See also Eichengreen and Fortes (1986).
6/ Cross default clauses typically don't include bonds. Wellon (1979) for
example, points out that when establishing cross default clauses,
experienced borrowers distinguish among types of debt.
7/ Traditionally, however, bondholders have tried to jointly face crisis
situations through different organizations, including the Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council and the Council of Foreign Bondholders.
Historically, however, different bondholder groups have many times engaged—33—
in internal discussions and have negotiated separately (Wynne 1951). Also,
in actual debt crisis situations, bondholders and banks have usually
disagreed sharply on how to face the problem. Perhaps the most recent and
extreme case is that of Costa Rica in 1980 where the bondholders,
represented by the Banque Nationale de Paris, and the banks, led by the Bank
of America, entered into a serious conflict. On the Costa Rica case see,
for example, Suratgar (19814).
8/ In Sachs and Cohen (1982) bond borrowing is also characterized by a lower
ceiling. Even though traditionally bonds have not been included in debt re—
schedulings, there is at least one recent case where this has happened. In
1980 ADELA--asmall Latin American development financing agency ——
rescheduleda US$25 million floating notes issue.
9/ See, for example, Kyle and Sachs (19814). Recently, however, a very limited
secondary market for LDCs' bank loans has developed.
10/ See Suratgar (19814).
11/ Basically, there are two possible strategies that can be followed in order
to motivate the empirical analysis reported below. First, a model of
borrowing and foreign debt pricing can be explicitly derived. Second, the
more important implications of existing models can be tested. In this paper
I have decided to follow the second route, since itallowsa more general
type of analysis. Thisapproach also has the advantage ofallowing testing
of the relative merits of alternative models. However, in a previous paper
(Edwards, 1983) I followed the first strategy and formally derived a model
of foreign borrowing and debt pricing.
12/ If, however, a risk averse lender is assumed, equation (2) will contain some
additional terms. See Gutentag and Herring (1985b)._314_
13/For an alternative way of deriving an equation similar to (2) in the context
of monopolistic banks, see Feder and Just (1977b).
114/ See, however, Edwards (1984).
15/ The papers by Feder and Just (197Th), Sachs (1981) and Edwards (19814) have
also excluded fees and commissions. Mills and Terell (19814) have found that
fees and commissions have been equivalent, on average, to 214 basis points.
16/ In my 198'4 article, I used data for only 19 countries. Also, in that study
a different estimation technique was used. The countries considered in the
present study are: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand,
Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Not all these countries had
data for every year. The data are available on request. It is important to
notice that, contrary to the more recent period, during 1976—80 spreads over
LIBOR experienced a nontrivial variation across countries in any particular
year.
17/ This, of course, is a standard procedure. See Judge et. al. (1980).
18/ The following instruments were used: constant, lagged debt-output ratio,
lagged reserves-GNP ratio, lagged and current current account ratio,
imports—GNP ratio, loan maturity, growth investment ratio, exports, debt
service ratio, real effective exchange rate index and growth.
19/ This statement has to be qualified in an important way. To the extent that
the debt—service ratio plays a role in the determination of the risk
premium, even if all of the newly borrowed funds are used for investment,
the spread will increase. The results reported in Table 1 indeed suggest
that the debt—service ratio has played some role in the process of
determination of the risk premium.—35—
20/SInce the debt ratio is computed relative to GNP and the debt service ratio
relative to exports, both point estimates cannot be directly compared.
21/ These assumptions are: 1) the equilibrium real exchange rate is constant in
every country, and 2) the equilibrium real exchange rate is the same across
countries for the period under study. These assumptions are, of course,
very restrictive.
22/ The countries included in this section are: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Spain, Thailand,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. This is a subset of the countries included in
the bank loan spreads analysis.
23/ Only a relatively smaller number of floating rate bonds were issued by the
developing countries during this period. Most of the bonds considered in
this study were straight bonds. A potential problem with these data is that
thedifferent bonds may have different call provisions. Unfortunately it is
notpossible to find data on these provisions from standard sources like the
World Bank or AGEFI.
214/ As before, F—statistics were computed to test whether the time specific and
country specific fixed effect dummies shoud be included in the regression.
The null hypothesis that the country dummies are jointly zero cannot be
rejected. However, the hypothesis that all the year dummies are zero is
rejected. As a result, these regressions included and excluded
25/ These data refer to yields on US dollar denominated bonds of comparable
maturities. For 1982 through 1985 the data were taken from Folkerts—Landau
(1985). For 1980—1981 the data were directly obtained from the
International Herald Tribune, which is the source used by Folkers—Landau.
The same bonds were followed through time. The following bonds were used:—36—
World Bank, 10 1/4, June1987;Mexico, 8 1/4, March 1987; Brazil, 8 i/it,
Decenber 1987. For all cases, except December 1981 and January 1985, the
yields refer to the first Monday of each month. For January 1985 and
December 19814, the second Monday was used. Kyle and Sachs (1985) also used
yields differentials with respect to World Bank notes to illustrate the
change in the valuation of the LDCs debt. Gutentag and Herring (1985)
looked at the spread over LIBOR on Nafinsa floating rate notes.
26/ These stories included the Alfa group announcement that it could not pay its
foreign debt (10 May 1982), Minister Silva Herzog's forecast of zero growth
for 1982 (13 May 1982), and Mexico's request for an IMF team to visit the
country (17 August 1982).
27/ This interpretation is somewhat consistent with the result of Section III,
where it was found that liquidity considerations played no major role in the
determination of risk premia in the bond market.
28/ This variable has also been used by Melvin and Schiagenhauff (1986). These
data were obtained from the IFS.
29/ Since Mexico is not a member of OPEC, the actual price obtained for Mexico's
"isthmus" quality oil was used. Unfortunately the time series for this
price start only in January 1981.
30/ Note that in this regression the role of political events has not been
incorporated formally. The reason for this is that it is not easy to
construct a "political instability" index. However, an analysis of the
residuals of this equation confirms the hypothesis that political
developments affected in a nontrivial way the pricing of Mexican bonds in
thesecondary market.
31/ These results are available from the author on request.—37—
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